The ECB Governing Council in an Enlarged Euro Area

Agnès Benassy-Quere and Edouard Turkisch

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Abstract: We study the impact of rotating votes in the ECB Governing Council after EMU enlargement, based on national and euro-wide Taylor rules and on a convergence assumption. We find that the rotation system yields monetary policy decisions that are close both to full centralization and to a voting rule without rotations.

Date: 2009
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Published in Journal of Common Market Studies, 2009, 47 (1), pp.25-54. ⟨10.1111/j.1468-5965.2008.01832.x⟩

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Journal Article: The ECB Governing Council in an Enlarged Euro Area (2009)
Working Paper: The ECB Governing Council in an Enlarged Euro Area (2009)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-00634791

DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-5965.2008.01832.x

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