Dynamic consistency for non-expected utility preferences

Vassili Vergopoulos ()
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Vassili Vergopoulos: CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique

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Abstract: This paper considers a generalization of the Savage framework in which there are two state spaces as follows: one to model events and one to define acts. The distinction between these two spaces typically induces non-consequentialist motives. The dynamic derivation of the Sure Thing Principle is studied in this framework. When these two spaces are substantially different, there exists a class of preferences that satisfy dynamic consistency and, at the same time, rationalize violations of the Sure Thing Principle. Consequently, it is possible to use non-expected utility preferences to study problems with dynamic consistency, as long as preferences belong to the previous class and as long as problems refer to information structures, defined as partitions over the set that serves to model events.

Keywords: Dynamic consistency; consequentialism; ambiguity; causality (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011-10-02
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

Published in Economic Theory, 2011, 48 (2-3), pp.493-518. ⟨10.1007/s00199-011-0633-7⟩

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-00639132

DOI: 10.1007/s00199-011-0633-7

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