Les représentations conditionnent la régulation

Pierre-Charles Pradier

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Abstract: Since the Basel Agreement, banks are mainly regulated by fine tuning the level of regulatory capital they hold as risk reserves. We argue that the emphasis on regulatory capital derives from the assumption that the world is risky. This approach has shown to be unable to curb systemic risk. Thinking in terms of uncertainty leads to an entirely different framework for banking regulation, were a targeted tax can disrupt the buildup of systemic risk on specific instruments.

Keywords: finance regulation systemic risk bank insurance uncertainty; finance régulation banque assurance risque systémique incertitude (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011-10-26
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Published in Refonder les normes de la Finance, Oct 2011, paris, France

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-00651260

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