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R & D coordination in standard setting organizations: The role of consortia

Justus Baron (), Yann Ménière () and Tim Pohlmann
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Justus Baron: CERNA i3 - Centre d'économie industrielle i3 - Mines Paris - PSL (École nationale supérieure des mines de Paris) - PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres - I3 - Institut interdisciplinaire de l’innovation - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique
Tim Pohlmann: TUB - Technical University of Berlin / Technische Universität Berlin

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Abstract: We analyze R&D competition and cooperation between firms involved in the development of a technology standard. Our model captures two types of incentives these firms are subject to: free-riding due to the public good nature of the standard and patent races in order to derive royalties from essential patents. As a consequence, R&D may be excessive or insufficient as compared to the collective optimum. Our goal is to test if consortia can address any type of inefficiency, by either reducing or increasing collective R&D investment. We address this question empirically on a large dataset of ICT standards, by assessing the effect of consortia on the number of standard-related patents filed by companies. After sorting standards entailing over or underinvestment, our results confirm that in the first case consortia have a chilling effect on patent filings, while it has an inflating effect in the second case.

Date: 2011-09-28
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Published in 2011 7th International Conference on Standardization and Innovation in Information Technology, SIIT 2011, Sep 2011, Berlin, Germany. pp.Article number 6083599, ⟨10.1109/SIIT.2011.6083599⟩

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-00659066

DOI: 10.1109/SIIT.2011.6083599

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