Evidence of in-play insider trading on a UK betting exchange

Alasdair Brown ()
Additional contact information
Alasdair Brown: Department of Financial and Management Studies - SOAS, University of London

Post-Print from HAL

Abstract: An open question in market microstructure is whether 'informed' traders have an advantage due to access to private, inside, information; or due to a superior ability to process public information. In this paper we attempt to answer this question with data from a sports betting exchange taken during play. Uniquely, this allows us to time-stamp information events to the nearest second, and to ensure we are observing all relevant information regarding the value of an asset. We find evidence of inside information but not of a superior ability to process public information. The first finding suggests that a subset of the betting population are observing the action before the wider public (possibly due to delays in the television signal), and betting using this informational advantage.

Keywords: Social; Sciences; &; Humanities (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011-02-15
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-00670250
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Published in Applied Economics, 2011, pp.1. ⟨10.1080/00036846.2010.537644⟩

Downloads: (external link)
https://hal.science/hal-00670250/document (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-00670250

DOI: 10.1080/00036846.2010.537644

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Post-Print from HAL
Bibliographic data for series maintained by CCSD ().