Cooperation Under Alternative Punishment Institutions:An Experiment

Marco Casari and Luigi Luini ()

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Abstract: While peer punishment has been shown to increase group cooperation, there is open debate on how cooperative norms can emerge and on what motives drive individuals to punish. In a public good experiment we compared alternative punishment institutions and found (1) higher cooperation levels under a consensual punishment institution than under autonomous individual punishment; (2) similar cooperation levels under sequential and simultaneous punishment institutions.

Keywords: Experiments; C91; C92; D23; Public goods; Peer punishment; Social norms; Team production; Experiments. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009-04-05
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-00685381
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (50)

Published in Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 2009, 71 (2), pp.273. ⟨10.1016/j.jebo.2009.03.022⟩

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Journal Article: Cooperation under alternative punishment institutions: An experiment (2009)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-00685381

DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2009.03.022

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