Career concerns incentives: An experimental test

Alexander Koch, Albrecht Morgenstern () and Philippe Raab ()

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Abstract: Holmström's (1982/99) career concerns model has become a workhorse for analyzing agency issues in many elds. The underlying signal jamming argument requires players to use information in a Bayesian way, which is difficult to directly test with eld data: typically little is known about the information that individuals base their decisions on. Our laboratory experiment provides prima facie evidence: i) the signal jamming mechanism successfully creates incentives on the labor supply side; ii) decision errors take time to decrease; iii) while subjects' average beliefs are remarkably consistent with play, a mild winner's curse arises on the labor demand side.

Keywords: C91; D83; L14; Incentives; Reputation; Career concerns; Signal jamming; Experiments (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009-05-03
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-00693820
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (11)

Published in Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 2009, 72 (1), pp.571. ⟨10.1016/j.jebo.2009.04.014⟩

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-00693820

DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2009.04.014

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