Cooperation and cultural transmission in a coordination game

Vicente Calabuig () and Gonzalo Olcina ()

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Abstract: The aim of this paper is to analyze if cooperation can be the product of cultural evolution in a two-stage coordination game, consisting of a production stage followed by a negotiation phase. We present an overlapping generations model with cultural transmission of preferences where the distribution of preferences in the population and the strategies are determined endogenously and simultaneously. There are several groups in the society; some of them play cooperatively and others do not. Socialization takes place inside the group, but there is a positive rate of migration among groups which parents anticipate. Our main result shows that all groups converge to the cooperative equilibrium.

Keywords: C78; D64; D63; Cultural Transmission; Coordination Game; Social Preferences; Cooperation; Migration (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009-05-18
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-00698840v1
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

Published in Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 2009, 72 (1), pp.188. ⟨10.1016/j.jebo.2009.05.005⟩

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Related works:
Journal Article: Cooperation and cultural transmission in a coordination game (2009)
Working Paper: Cooperation and Cultural Transmission in a Coordination Game (2007)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-00698840

DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2009.05.005

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