The Missing Lens in Family Firm Governance Theory: A Self-Other Typology of Parental Altruism

Rodolphe Durand (), Michael Lubatkin and Yan Ling
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Rodolphe Durand: GREGH - Groupement de Recherche et d'Etudes en Gestion à HEC - HEC Paris - Ecole des Hautes Etudes Commerciales - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique

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Abstract: Drawing on three prominent views about the "self" and the self's relationship with "others", a typology of five parental altruistic archetypes is derived that exhausts the possible altruistic influences on the governance of family firms. When taken in concert, these five types comprise a more balanced explanation of the cross-sectional variance in the governance efficiency of these firms than do the explanations from agency theory and more recently, by Schulze and colleagues. Therefore, the typology provides an improved explanation of why some family firms are more able than others to capitalize on the family governance's positive attributes.

Keywords: Family firms; Parental altruism; Governance (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007-10
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (42)

Published in Journal of Business Research, 2007, vol. 60, n° 10, pp. 1022-1029. ⟨10.1016/j.jbusres.2006.12.019⟩

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-00699185

DOI: 10.1016/j.jbusres.2006.12.019

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