Bidding among Friends and Enemies with Symmetric Information

David Ettinger ()

Post-Print from HAL

Abstract: We consider an auction setting, in a symmetric information framework, in which bidders, even if they fail to obtain the good, care about the price paid by the winner. We prove that the outcome of the first- price auction is not aff ected by identity independent price externalities while the outcome of the second-price auction is. In contrast, identity dependent price externalities a ect the outcome of both auction formats. In any case, the second-price auction exacerbates the eff ects of price externalities.

Keywords: auctions; symmetric information; externalities; toeholds; budget-constraints (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-00701295v1
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

Published in Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 2010, 166 (2), pp.365-385

Downloads: (external link)
https://hal.science/hal-00701295v1/document (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Bidding among Friends and Enemies with Symmetric Information (2010)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-00701295

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Post-Print from HAL
Bibliographic data for series maintained by CCSD ().