Auctions and shareholdings

David Ettinger ()

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Abstract: This paper examines how shareholdings affect auctions' revenue and efficiency with independent private values. Two types of shareholdings are analyzed: Vertical (resp: horizontal) toeholds cover situations in which bidders own a fraction of the seller's profit (resp: a share of their competitor's profit). Expected revenue is an increasing (resp: decreasing) function of vertical (resp: horizontal) toeholds. With both types of toeholds, auction formats are not revenue equivalent. Expected revenue is affected to a greater extent by the presence of toeholds in the second price auction than in the first-price auction.

Keywords: auctions; private values; toeholds; revenue comparison (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-00701303v1
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (20)

Published in Annales d'Economie et de Statistique, 2008, 90, pp.1-23

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Journal Article: Auctions and Shareholdings (2008)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-00701303

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