The Evolutionary Stability of Constant Consistent Conjectures
Alex Possajennikov ()
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In the general context of smooth two-player games, this paper shows that there is a close connection between (constant) consistent conjectures in a given game and the evolutionary stability of these conjectures. Evolutionarily stable conjectures are consistent and consistent conjectures are the only interior candidates to be evolutionarily stable. Examples are provided to illustrate the result.
Keywords: C72; D43; L13; Consistent conjectures; Evolutionary stability; Indirect evolution (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Published in Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, Elsevier, 2009, 72 (1), pp.21. ⟨10.1016/j.jebo.2009.05.013⟩
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Journal Article: The evolutionary stability of constant consistent conjectures (2009)
Working Paper: Evolutionary Stability of Constant Consistent Conjectures (2004)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-00701872
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