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Efficiency in auctions with crossholdings

David Ettinger ()

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Abstract: We study the impact of crossholdings on the efficiency of the standard auction formats. The ascending auction is not equivalent to the second-price auction. In a class of examples, the ascending auction is the only efficient standard auction format.

Keywords: Auctions; Efficiency; Crossholdings (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2003
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Published in Applied Economics Letters, Taylor & Francis (Routledge): SSH Titles, 2003, 80 (1), pp.1-7

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