Efficiency in auctions with crossholdings
David Ettinger ()
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We study the impact of crossholdings on the efficiency of the standard auction formats. The ascending auction is not equivalent to the second-price auction. In a class of examples, the ascending auction is the only efficient standard auction format.
Keywords: Auctions; Efficiency; Crossholdings (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Published in Applied Economics Letters, Taylor & Francis (Routledge): SSH Titles, 2003, 80 (1), pp.1-7
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Journal Article: Efficiency in auctions with crossholdings (2003)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-00702434
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