Private Valuation of a Public Good in Three Auction Mechanisms

Arnaud Dragicevic () and David Ettinger ()
Additional contact information
Arnaud Dragicevic: THEMA - Théorie économique, modélisation et applications - UCP - Université de Cergy Pontoise - Université Paris-Seine - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique

Post-Print from HAL

Abstract: We evaluate the impact of three auction mechanisms--the Becker-DeGroot-Marschak (BDM) mechanism, the second-price auction (SPA), and the random nth-price auction (NPA)--in the measurement of private willingness-to-pay and willingness-to-accept for a pure public good. Our results show that the endowment effect is lower with the BDM mechanism. In this market mechanism, the effect disappears after a few repetitions. Yet, on a logarithmic scale, the random nth-price auction yields the highest speed of convergence towards equality of welfare indices. We also observe that subjects value public goods in reference to their private subjective benefit derived from their public funding.

Keywords: WTP-WTA disparity; auction mechanisms; public goods; private provisions (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-00704708v1
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Published in Journal of Benefit-Cost Analysis, 2011, 2 (2), pp.1-27

Downloads: (external link)
https://hal.science/hal-00704708v1/document (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Private Valuation of a Public Good in Three Auction Mechanisms (2011)
Journal Article: Private Valuation of a Public Good in Three Auction Mechanisms (2011)
Working Paper: Private Valuation of a Public Good in Three Auction Mechanisms (2010)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-00704708

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Post-Print from HAL
Bibliographic data for series maintained by CCSD ().