Competition and Public Service Obligations: Regulatory Rules and Industries Games

C. Defeuilley
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C. Defeuilley: CIRED - centre international de recherche sur l'environnement et le développement - Cirad - Centre de Coopération Internationale en Recherche Agronomique pour le Développement - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - AgroParisTech - ENPC - École nationale des ponts et chaussées - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique

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Abstract: The introduction of competition in regulated industries may have positive or negative side-effects on the provision of collective goods or services. The paper shows that these effects are closely related to two associated elements: the industrial strategies developed by utilities and the regulatory environment within which they operate. Regulatory rules and corporate strategies influence the treatment of public service obligations. This raises a major issue regarding the regulation of public utilities. To reduce the drawbacks of the introduction of competition, it is necessary to set regulatory rules that allow the implementation of market configurations enabling public utilities to follow a public service orientation rather than a pure market-based approach. © CIRIEC 1999.

Date: 1999
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

Published in Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics, 1999, 70 (1), pp.25. ⟨10.1111/1467-8292.00098⟩

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-00716371

DOI: 10.1111/1467-8292.00098

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