Self-selection and the Power of Incentive Schemes: An Experimental Study
Jana Vyrastekova (),
Sander Onderstal () and
Pierre Koning ()
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We examine how self-selection of workers depends on the power of incentive schemes and how it affects team performance if the power of the incentive schemes is increased. In a laboratory experiment, we let subjects choose between (low-powered) team incentives and (high-powered) individual incentives. We observe that subjects exhibiting high trust or reciprocity in the trust game are more likely to choose team incentives. When exposed to individual incentives, subjects who chose team incentives perform worse if both the unobservable interdependency between their effort and their incentive to cooperate under team incentives are high.
Keywords: Social; Sciences; &; Humanities (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Published in Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis (Routledge), 2011, pp.1. ⟨10.1080/00036846.2011.587787⟩
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Working Paper: Self-Selection and the Power of Incentive Schemes: An Experimental Study (2010)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-00716630
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