Who Monitors the Monitor? Stigmatizing Events and Board Member Careers

Burak Koyuncu, Luis R. Gomez-Mejia and Marianna Makri
Additional contact information
Burak Koyuncu: Tr@jectoires - Pôle Trajectoires - Rouen Business School - Rouen Business School

Post-Print from HAL

Abstract: This study addresses whether board members pay a price when things go wrong and under what conditions the market may penalize stigmatized directors. We use a sample of 354 directors, which includes 177 directors who have been personally involved as a board member in stigmatizing events such as corporate bankruptcies, major litigation or regulatory infractions, major accounting restatements and other corporate scandals, approving particularly egregious CEO compensation packages, or other similar circumstances. Inconsistent with agency and stigma theory predictions, our findings show that these problem directors may even be rewarded by the market.

Keywords: Corporate Elites; Stigma; Agency Theory (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011-06-01
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Published in 11th Annual Conference of the European Academy of Management (EURAM), Jun 2011, Tallinn, Estonia

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-00718582

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Post-Print from HAL
Bibliographic data for series maintained by CCSD ().