Competition and bargaining in wireless networks with spectrum leasing

Luis Guijarro, Vicent Pla, Bruno Tuffin (), Patrick Maillé () and Jose Vidal
Additional contact information
Luis Guijarro: UPV - Universitat Politècnica de València = Universitad Politecnica de Valencia = Polytechnic University of Valencia
Vicent Pla: UPV - Universitat Politècnica de València = Universitad Politecnica de Valencia = Polytechnic University of Valencia
Bruno Tuffin: DIONYSOS - Dependability Interoperability and perfOrmance aNalYsiS Of networkS - Centre Inria de l'Université de Rennes - Inria - Institut National de Recherche en Informatique et en Automatique - IRISA-D2 - RÉSEAUX, TÉLÉCOMMUNICATION ET SERVICES - IRISA - Institut de Recherche en Informatique et Systèmes Aléatoires - UR - Université de Rennes - INSA Rennes - Institut National des Sciences Appliquées - Rennes - INSA - Institut National des Sciences Appliquées - UBS - Université de Bretagne Sud - ENS Rennes - École normale supérieure - Rennes - Inria - Institut National de Recherche en Informatique et en Automatique - Télécom Bretagne - CentraleSupélec - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique
Patrick Maillé: RSM - Département Réseaux, Sécurité et Multimédia - UEB - Université européenne de Bretagne - European University of Brittany - Télécom Bretagne - IMT - Institut Mines-Télécom [Paris]
Jose Vidal: UPV - Universitat Politècnica de València = Universitad Politecnica de Valencia = Polytechnic University of Valencia

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Abstract: The case for a competitive market operated by a Mobile Network Operator (MNO) and a Mobile Virtual Network Operator (MVNO) is analysed in the paper. The resource that is leased by the MNO to the MVNO is spectrum. The MNO and the MVNO compete a la Bertrand ' posting subscription prices and the mobile users may choose to subscribe to one operator. The scenario is modeled by a three-level game comprising a bargaining game, which models the spectrum leasing by the MNO; a competition game, which models the price competition between the MNO and the MVNO; and a subscription game, which models the subscription choice by the mobile users, and the outcome of which may be either not to subscribe, to subscribe to the MNO or to subscribe to the MVNO. The game is solved through backward induction, and each level has a specific solution concept: Shapley value, for the bargain; Nash equilibrium, for the competition; and Wardrop equilibrium, for the subscription. The paper assesses which conditions lead to an equilibrium where the competition does take place, which are expressed as restrictions for the spectrum leasing price agreed at the bargaining, and the spectrum efficiency improvement achieved by the MVNO. Furthermore, it argues that the amount of the leased spectrum should be fixed exogenously in order to achieve optimal user and social welfares.

Keywords: Game theory; Pricing; Competition; Wireless networks (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011-12
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-00725488v1
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Published in IEEE GLOBECOM, Dec 2011, Houston, Tx, United States

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