Net Neutrality Debate: Impact of Competition among ISPs

François Boussion, Patrick Maillé () and Bruno Tuffin ()
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François Boussion: ENS Cachan Bretagne - École normale supérieure - Cachan, antenne de Bretagne - ENS Cachan - École normale supérieure - Cachan
Patrick Maillé: RSM - Département Réseaux, Sécurité et Multimédia - UEB - Université européenne de Bretagne - European University of Brittany - Télécom Bretagne - IMT - Institut Mines-Télécom [Paris]
Bruno Tuffin: DIONYSOS - Dependability Interoperability and perfOrmance aNalYsiS Of networkS - Centre Inria de l'Université de Rennes - Inria - Institut National de Recherche en Informatique et en Automatique - IRISA-D2 - RÉSEAUX, TÉLÉCOMMUNICATION ET SERVICES - IRISA - Institut de Recherche en Informatique et Systèmes Aléatoires - UR - Université de Rennes - INSA Rennes - Institut National des Sciences Appliquées - Rennes - INSA - Institut National des Sciences Appliquées - UBS - Université de Bretagne Sud - ENS Rennes - École normale supérieure - Rennes - Inria - Institut National de Recherche en Informatique et en Automatique - Télécom Bretagne - CentraleSupélec - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique

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Abstract: Network neutrality has recently been the topic of an important debate, in both the telecommunication and political worlds, because of its potential impact in every-day life. While there has been many studies discussing the advantages and drawbacks of neutrality, there is no game-theoretical study dealing with the observable situation of competitive ISPs in front of a (quasi-)monopolistic content provider (CP), while it is a complaint from ISPs, and an illustration of the non-neutrality need. This paper provides a first game-theoretical analysis of relations between two competitive ISPs and a single CP, in the form of a four-level game, played at different time scales. This game is analyzed by backward induction. We show that while the complaint from ISPs is relevant with a such a competitive model, inserting side payments does not solve the problem.

Keywords: Network neutrality; Competition; Pricing; Game theory (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012-01-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com and nep-net
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-00725489v1
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

Published in COMSNETS 2012: 4th International Conference on Communication Systems and Networks, Jan 2012, Bangalore, India. pp.1-8

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