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On the Equivalence of Nash and Evolutionary Equilibrium in Finite Populations

Burkhard Hehenkamp (), Alex Possajennikov () and Tobias Guse

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Abstract: This paper provides sufficient and partially necessary conditions for the equivalence of symmetric Nash and evolutionary equilibrium in symmetric games played by finite populations. The conditions are based on generalized constant-sum and "smallness" properties, the latter of which is known from models of perfect competition and large games. The conditions are illustrated on examples including oligopoly games.

Keywords: C72; C73; Nash equilibrium; Evolutionary stability; Finite pop-ulations (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009-09-04
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-00727591
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Published in Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, Elsevier, 2009, 73 (2), pp.254. ⟨10.1016/j.jebo.2009.08.011⟩

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Related works:
Journal Article: On the equivalence of Nash and evolutionary equilibrium in finite populations (2010) Downloads
Working Paper: On the Equivalence of Nash and Evolutionary Equilibrium in Finite Populations (2008)
Working Paper: On the Equivalence of Nash and Evolutionary Equilibrium in Finite Populations (2008)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-00727591

DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2009.08.011

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