When the international lender of last resort faces a " too big to fail " sovereign borrower: the " jeu de faux semblants "

Cécile Bastidon () and Philippe Gilles
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Philippe Gilles: LEAD - Laboratoire d'Économie Appliquée au Développement - UTLN - Université de Toulon

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Abstract: This paper aims to analyse the relationship between Russia and the IMF. The model used is one with a multilateral lender, whose utility depends on the stability of the international financial system, and a borrowing country, whose debt threatens this stability.

Keywords: contracts and reputation; international lending and debt problems; international monetary arrangements and debt institutions; asymmetric and private information; transactionnal relationships; contracts and reputation. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2000-05-23
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-00731546
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Published in "Reshaping the architecture of the international financial system", C.D.C./C.E.P.I.I./C.E.F.I., May 2000, Sienne, Italy

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-00731546

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