EXPERIMENTAL DUOPOLIES UNDER PRICE GUARANTEES

Gerardo Sabater (), Nikolaos Georgantzís (), Enrique Fatas () and Mañez Castillejo Juan ()
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Gerardo Sabater: Economics - University Jaume I
Mañez Castillejo Juan: Economia Aplicada II - UV - Universitat de València = University of Valencia

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Abstract: In a symmetric differentiated experimental duopoly we test the ability of Price Guarantees (PGs) to raise prices above the competitive levels. Different types of PGs ("aggressive" and "soft" price-beating and price-matching) are implemented either as an exogenously imposed market rule or as a business strategy. Our results show that PGs may lead close to the collusive outcome, depending on whether the interaction between duopolists is repeated and provided that the guarantee is not of the "aggressive" price-beating type.

Keywords: Social; Sciences; &; Humanities (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011-09-14
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-00732113v1
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Published in Applied Economics, 2011, 45 (01), pp.15-35. ⟨10.1080/00036846.2011.568398⟩

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-00732113

DOI: 10.1080/00036846.2011.568398

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