Dynamic oligopoly with partial cooperation and antitrust threshold

Akio Matsumoto, Ugo Merlone and Ferenc Szidarovszky

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Abstract: A general framework of partial cooperation and shareholding interlocks in oligopolies is first introduced, and then the best responses of the firms are determined. The monotonic dependence of the equilibrium industry output on the coopeation levels of the firms is proved. Conditions are given for the local asymptotic stability of the equilibrium which require sufficiently small speed of adjustment. Antitrust thresholds are then introduced into the model which may result in the loss of equilibrium or in the presense of multiple equilibria. The dynamic behavior of the associate dynamic models with adpative output adjustments also becomes more complex: period-2 cycles may emerge and coexist with stationary states.

Keywords: C71; Oligopolies; Partial cooperation; Shareholding interlocks; Antitrust threshold (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009-09-15
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-00732525
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Published in Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 2009, 73 (2), pp.259. ⟨10.1016/j.jebo.2009.08.014⟩

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Journal Article: Dynamic oligopoly with partial cooperation and antitrust threshold (2010)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-00732525

DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2009.08.014

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