Why the Empty Shells Were Not Fired: A Semi-Bibliographical Note

Itzhak Gilboa

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Abstract: This note documents Aumann's reason for omitting the "empty shells" argument for the common prior assumption from the final version of "Correlated Equilibrium as an Expression of Bayesian Rationality." It then continues to discuss the argument and concludes that rational entities cannot learn their own identity; if they do not know it a priori, they never will.

Keywords: NC (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011-10
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

Published in Episteme, 2011, 8 (3), pp.301-308. ⟨10.3366/epi.2011.0023⟩

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Working Paper: Why the Empty Shells Were Not Fired: A Semi-Bibliographical Note (1992)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-00745603

DOI: 10.3366/epi.2011.0023

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