Expected Utility in the Context of a Game

Itzhak Gilboa and David Schmeidler

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Abstract: A decision maker faces a decision problem, or a game against nature. For each probability distribution over the state of the world (nature's strategies), she has a weak order over her acts (pure strategies).We formulate conditions on these weak orders guaranteeing that they can be jointly represented by expected utility maximization with respect to an almost-unique state-dependent utility, that is, a matrix assigning real numbers to act-state pairs. As opposed to a utility function that is derived in another context, the utility matrix derived in the game will incorporate all psychological or sociological determinants of well-being that result from the very fact that the outcomes are obtained in a given game.

Keywords: Expected Utility; Game (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2003
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (11)

Published in Games and Economic Behavior, 2003, vol. 44, pp. 184-194. ⟨10.1016/S0899-8256(03)00015-0⟩

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-00752136

DOI: 10.1016/S0899-8256(03)00015-0

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