Information Dependent Games: Can Common Sense Be Common Knowledge?

Itzhak Gilboa and David Schmeidler

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Abstract: This paper attempts to study the consistency of several basic game-theoretic axioms. Two by-products are the introduction of information-dependent games, and a formal treatment of the framework of game theoretic axioms. In this setup a version of the Surprise Test Paradox is used to prove that common sense cannot be common knowledge.

Keywords: Information Dependent Games; Common Sense; Common Knowledge (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1988
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (22)

Published in Economics Letters, 1988, vol. 27, issue 3, pp. 215-221. ⟨10.1016/0165-1765(88)90173-5⟩

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Journal Article: Information dependent games: Can common sense be common knowledge? (1988)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-00753242

DOI: 10.1016/0165-1765(88)90173-5

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