Publicly-Funded R&D Programs and Survival of Patents

Roger Svensson

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Abstract: I apply a survival model to a detailed dataset of Swedish patents to estimate how different financing factors affect the likelihood of patent renewal. Since the owners know more about the patents than potential external financiers, there is a problem of asymmetric information. To overcome this, Sweden has for a long time relied on government support rather than private venture capital. In the empirical analysis, two kinds of government loans are unbundled. The empirical results show that patents which have received soft government loans in the R&D-phase have a higher probability of expiring than patents without such financing. But patents that have received more market-oriented government loans during the commercialization phase are renewed for as long as other commercialized patents. This finding indicates that it is the contract terms rather than bad choices of projects that explain the low renewal of some patents with government financing.

Keywords: Social; Sciences; &; Humanities (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011-12-09
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-00762896
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Published in Applied Economics, 2011, 45 (10), pp.1343-1358. ⟨10.1080/00036846.2011.617700⟩

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Journal Article: Publicly-funded R&D programs and survival of patents (2013)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-00762896

DOI: 10.1080/00036846.2011.617700

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