Appels d'offres concurrentiels et avantage au sortant: une étude empirique du secteur du transport public urbain en France

Anne Yvrande-Billon ()
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Anne Yvrande-Billon: CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique

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Abstract: This paper investigates the determinants of contracts' renewal in utilities industries where competitive tendering is used. As most of these contracts remain in the hands of the incumbents, we study the reasons of such a stability. More precisely, the empirical analysis deals with the urban public transport sector in France and looks for the determinants of the incumbents' advantage. The database we built gathers all the auctions organized in this sector between 1995 and 2006. The econometric study shows that the main determinants of incumbents' advantage are the market share of the incumbent and the degree of transparency of the competitive tendering procedure. These results question the existence of an effective competition and the benefits of competitive tendering in the sector.

Keywords: Competitive Tendering; Incumbent's Advantage; Urban Public Transport; appels d'offres; avantage au sortant; transport public urbain (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009
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Published in Revue d'économie industrielle , 2009, 127, pp.113-130

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-00764004

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