L'incidence de l'activisme actionnarial sur les mécanismes de gouvernance: le cas français

Carine Girard ()
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Carine Girard: Audencia Recherche - Audencia Business School

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Abstract: Prior research shows that the absence of a significant market reaction at public announcement of shareholder activism is largely attributable to the weak visibility of conflict. For this reason we studied changes in corporate governance relevant to the visibility of conflict. From a sample of 59 listed companies with dissident shareholders between January 1989 and December 2000, we tried to measure the effects of shareholder activism on corporate governance according to the degree of influence of minority shareholders.

Keywords: Corporate governance; Shareholder activism; Proxy contests; Gouvernement des entreprises; Activisme actionnarial; Bataille de procurations (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2004-09
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-00765244
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Published in Finance Contrôle Stratégie, 2004, 7 (3), pp.91-116

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