Les mécanismes de défense anti-acquisition profitent-ils vraiment aux actionnaires ?

Christine Noël Lemaitre () and Etienne Redor ()
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Christine Noël Lemaitre: Audencia Recherche - Audencia Business School
Etienne Redor: Audencia Recherche - Audencia Business School

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Abstract: The aim of this paper is to present the main anti-takeover mechanisms in order to question their usefulness for shareholders and managers through a literature review. By confronting the entrenchment and the shareholders interest theories, we show that most of anti-takeover mechanisms are more beneficial for managers than for shareholders, because they allow to increase their power and their personal benefits. The conclusions of this paper should reinforce the vigilance of shareholders because antitakeover mechanisms would result in wealth destruction.

Date: 2009-12
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Published in Revue Française de Gestion, 2009, (198-199), pp.259-275

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-00771099

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