Dynamic Systems of Social Interactions

Ulrich Horst

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Abstract: We state conditions for existence and uniqueness of equilibria in evolutionary models with an infinity of locally and globally interacting agents. Agents face repeated discrete choice problems. Their utility depends on the actions of some designated neighbors and the average choice throughout the whole population. We show that the dynamics on the level of aggregate behavior can be described by a deterministic measure-valued integral equation. If some form of positive complementarities prevails we establish convergence and ergodicity results for aggregate activities. We apply our convergence results to study a class of population games with random matching.

Keywords: C63; D50; D71; Evolutionary dynamics; social interaction; equilibrium; interacting particle systems; coordination games (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010-01-26
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-00781340
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

Published in Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 2010, 73 (2), pp.158. ⟨10.1016/j.jebo.2009.09.007⟩

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Journal Article: Dynamic systems of social interactions (2010)
Working Paper: Dynamic systems of social interactions (2010)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-00781340

DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2009.09.007

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