Anonymous implementation of the Lindahl correspondence: possibility and impossibility results

Sébastien Rouillon

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Abstract: This paper deals with the existence of anonymous mechanisms to realize the Lindahl correspondence. We consider, in turn, constant and decreasing returns to scale technologies for producing public goods. In each case, we provide a continuous (but not smooth) and weakly balanced mechanism, which meets the two conditions. We then remark that they satisfy a property (see property NC), which is related to, but in fact stronger than anonymity. Finally, we prove that if a mechanism has this property, if it is weakly balanced and implements the Lindahl correspondence, then it cannot be differentiable around Nash equilibria.

Keywords: implementation; lindahl; possibility; impossibility (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

Published in Social Choice and Welfare, 2013, 40 (40), pp.1179-1203. ⟨10.1007/s00355-012-0662-6⟩

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Journal Article: Anonymous implementation of the Lindahl correspondence: possibility and impossibility results (2013)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-00798338

DOI: 10.1007/s00355-012-0662-6

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