Efficiency of purchasing and selling agents in markets with quality uncertainty: the case of illicit drug transactions

Christian Ben Lakhdar (), Hervé Leleu, Nicolas Vaillant () and François-Charles Wolff

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Date: 2013
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Published in European Journal of Operational Research, 2013, 226 (3), pp.646-657

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Related works:
Journal Article: Efficiency of purchasing and selling agents in markets with quality uncertainty: The case of illicit drug transactions (2013)
Working Paper: Efficiency of purchasing and selling agents in markets with quality uncertainty: The case of illicit drug transactions (2013)
Working Paper: Efficiency of purchasing and selling agents in markets with quality uncertainty: The case of illicit drug transactions (2011)
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