Do remittances lead to a public moral hazard in developing countries? An empirical investigation

Christian Hubert Ebeke ()
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Christian Hubert Ebeke: CERDI - Centre d'Études et de Recherches sur le Développement International - UCA [2017-2020] - Université Clermont Auvergne [2017-2020] - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique

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Abstract: This paper tests the hypothesis that in a context of 'bad governance', remittance inflows strongly reduce public spending on education and health in receiving countries; a phenomenon called the 'public moral hazard problem'. Using a large sample of 86 developing countries over the period 1996-2007, and after factoring in the endogeneity of remittances, the results suggest a negative impact of remittances on public spending on education and health, when governance is bad in remittance-dependent economies.

Keywords: Social; Sciences; &; Humanities (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012-04-03
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-00807100
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (27)

Published in The Journal of Development Studies, 2012, 48 (8), pp.1. ⟨10.1080/00220388.2011.615918⟩

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-00807100

DOI: 10.1080/00220388.2011.615918

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