Reputation with Analogical Reasoning

Philippe Jehiel () and Larry Samuelson ()
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Larry Samuelson: Department of Economics - Yale University [New Haven]

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Abstract: We consider a repeated interaction between a long-run player and a sequence of short-run players, in which the long-run player may either be rational or may be a mechanical type who plays the same (possibly mixed) action in every stage game. We depart from the classical model in assuming that the short-run players make inferences by analogical reasoning, meaning that they correctly identify the average strategy of each type of long-run player, but do not recognize how this play varies across histories. Concentrating on 2 × 2 games, we provide a characterization of equilibrium payoffs, establishing a payoff bound for the rational long-run player that can be strictly larger than the familiar "Stackelberg" bound. We also provide a characterization of equilibrium behavior, showing that play begins with either a reputation-building or a reputation-spending stage (depending on parameters), followed by a reputation-manipulation stage.

Date: 2012-12
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (17)

Published in Quarterly Journal of Economics, 2012, 127 (4), pp.1927-1969. ⟨10.1093/qje/qjs031⟩

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Journal Article: Reputation with Analogical Reasoning (2012)
Working Paper: Reputation with Analogical Reasoning (2012)
Working Paper: Reputation with Analogical Reasoning (2011)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-00813043

DOI: 10.1093/qje/qjs031

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