Robust Rationalizability Under Almost Common Certainty of Payoff

Stephen Morris, Satoru Takahashi and Olivier Tercieux

Post-Print from HAL

Abstract: An action is robustly rationalizable if it is rationalizable for every type who has almost common certainty of payoffs. We illustrate by means of an example that an action may not be robustly rationalizable even if it is weakly dominant, and argue that robust rationalizability is a very stringent refinement of rationalizability. Nonetheless, we show that every strictly rationalizable action is robustly rationalizable. We also investigate how permissive robust rationalizability becomes if we require that players be fully certain of their own payoffs.

Date: 2012-03
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

Published in Japanese Economic Review, 2012, 63 (1), pp.57-67. ⟨10.1111/j.1468-5876.2011.00553.x⟩

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
Journal Article: ROBUST RATIONALIZABILITY UNDER ALMOST COMMON CERTAINTY OF PAYOFFS (2012)
Working Paper: Robust Rationalizability Under Almost Common Certainty of Payoff (2012)
Working Paper: Robust Rationalizability under Almost Common Certainty of Payoffs (2011)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-00813054

DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-5876.2011.00553.x

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Post-Print from HAL
Bibliographic data for series maintained by CCSD ().