Risk allocation and the costs and benefits of public--private partnerships

Elisabetta Iossa and David Martimort

Post-Print from HAL

Abstract: We study the agency costs of delegated public service provision, focusing on the link between organizational forms and uncertainty at project implementation. We consider a dynamic multitask moral hazard environment where the mapping between effort and performance is ex ante uncertain but new information may arise during operations. Our analysis highlights the costs and benefits that bundling planning and implementation--as under public--private partnerships--can bring in terms of project design and operational costs under various scenarios, possibly allowing for asymmetric information, moral hazard and renegotiation. It also shows that relying on private finance enhances the benefits of bundling only if lenders have enough expertise to assess project risks.

Date: 2012-04
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (42)

Published in RAND Journal of Economics, 2012, 43 (3), pp.442-474. ⟨10.1111/j.1756-2171.2012.00181.x⟩

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
Journal Article: Risk allocation and the costs and benefits of public--private partnerships (2012)
Working Paper: Risk allocation and the costs and benefits of public--private partnerships (2012)
Working Paper: Risk Allocation and the Costs and Benefits of Public-Private Partnerships (2011)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-00813153

DOI: 10.1111/j.1756-2171.2012.00181.x

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Post-Print from HAL
Bibliographic data for series maintained by CCSD ().