Multiparty Argumentation Game for Consensual Expansion

Maxime Morge () and Bromuri Stefano ()
Additional contact information
Maxime Morge: LIFL - Laboratoire d'Informatique Fondamentale de Lille - Université de Lille, Sciences et Technologies - Inria - Institut National de Recherche en Informatique et en Automatique - Université de Lille, Sciences Humaines et Sociales - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, SMAC - Systèmes Multi-Agents et Comportements - CRIStAL - Centre de Recherche en Informatique, Signal et Automatique de Lille - UMR 9189 - Centrale Lille - Université de Lille - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, Dipartimento di Informatica [Pisa] - UniPi - University of Pisa [Italy] = Università di Pisa [Italia] = Université de Pise [Italie], DI - Dipartimento di Informatica [Pisa] - UniPi - University of Pisa [Italy] = Università di Pisa [Italia] = Université de Pise [Italie]

Post-Print from HAL

Abstract: We consider here a set of agents, each of them having her own argumentation. Arguments and conflicts between them are subjective. The aim of each agent is to enrich her argumentation by taking into account the arguments and conflicts of the other agents. We adopt here an individual-based approach where the cross-fertilization of argumentations emerge from the interactions between the agents. For this purpose, we formalize a multi-party argumentation game using Event Calculus. At the end of the game, each agent extends its argumentation by using the arguments exchanged and the conflicts shared. As we show formally, such an expansion is consensual. By adopting an individual-based approach, our model is explanatory since it highlights the conflicts between the agents.

Date: 2013
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Published in ICAART'2013 -- Barcelona (Spain) -- February 15-18, 2013, 2013, Spain. pp.160-165

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-00826476

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Post-Print from HAL
Bibliographic data for series maintained by CCSD ().