The Impact of Ownership Structure and Control Mechanisms on Transaction Costs: An Empirical Study of Firms Listed on the Euronext Paris Stock Exchange for the Period between 2004 and 2007

Alexis Guyot ()
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Alexis Guyot: Audencia Recherche - Audencia Business School

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Abstract: This article examines the impact of control structures on transaction costs of firms listed on the Euronext Paris Stock Exchange for the period between 2004 and 2007. The results of our tests show that the concentration of control, especially by financial institutions, raises stock transaction costs. We also demonstrate how the issuing of shares with double voting rights leads to an increase in transaction costs. In that case, the cost of liquidity increases in line with the extent of the gap between ownership and control. Finally, with the exception of the second largest core shareholder, who may be perceived as adding additionnal control by investors, transaction costs increase in line with the degree of control exercised by second-tier large shareholders.

Keywords: government ownership; government corporations; stock exchanges; transaction costs; inventory control (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010-09
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Published in Bankers Markets & Investors : an academic & professional review, 2010, 108, pp.4-20

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-00841050

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