Les auditeurs financiers face aux conflits d'agence: une étude des déterminants des honoraires d'audit en France

Cédric Lesage () and Chiraz Ben Ali ()
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Cédric Lesage: GREGH - Groupement de Recherche et d'Etudes en Gestion à HEC - HEC Paris - Ecole des Hautes Etudes Commerciales - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique
Chiraz Ben Ali: IPAG Business School

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Abstract: Considering the audit of financial statements as a mechanism that reduces information asymmetry, one can hypothesize that agency conflicts influence audit fees. Studying the audit fees paid by the SBF 250 listed firms, our results show : 1) the absence of a significant relationship between managerial ownership and audit fees ; 2) a curvilinear relation (inversed U shape) between controlling shareholders ownership and audit fees ; 3) a negative relation between family control and audit fees. These results outline the dominance of agency conflicts between controlling shareholders and minority shareholders in France, unlike in Anglo-Saxon countries where the dominant conflict is between managers and shareholders. The study permits to draw practical implications for practitioners and regulators.

Keywords: audit fees; controlling shareholders; minority expropriation; agency conflict; honoraires d'audit; actionnaire de contrôle; expropriation des minoritaires; conflit d'agence (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013-04-01
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

Published in Comptabilité Contrôle Audit / Accounting Auditing Control, 2013, 19 (1), pp.59-89. ⟨10.3917/cca.191.0059⟩

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-00853061

DOI: 10.3917/cca.191.0059

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