Growth and Irreversible Pollution: Are Emission Permits a Means of Avoiding Environmental and Poverty Traps?
Fabien Prieur,
Alain Jean-Marie () and
Mabel Tidball ()
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Alain Jean-Marie: MAESTRO - Models for the performance analysis and the control of networks - CRISAM - Centre Inria d'Université Côte d'Azur - Inria - Institut National de Recherche en Informatique et en Automatique, LIRMM - Laboratoire d'Informatique de Robotique et de Microélectronique de Montpellier - UM - Université de Montpellier - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique
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Abstract:
We consider an OLG model with emissions arising from production and potentially irreversible pollution. Pollution control consists of the assignment of permits to firms; private agents also can abate pollution. In this setting, we prove that multiple equilibria exist. Due to the possible irreversibility of pollution, the economy can be dragged into both environmental and poverty traps. First, we show that choosing an emission quota at the lowest level beyond a critical threshold is a means to avoid these two types of traps. We also prove that when the agents do not engage in maintenance, a reduction of the quota leads to a reduction in pollution but also to slower capital accumulation. In contrast, when agents do engage in maintenance, a reduction of the quota provides a double dividend.
Keywords: overlapping generations; environmental and poverty traps; irreversible pollution; emission permits (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013-03
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Published in Macroeconomic Dynamics, 2013, 17 (2), pp.261-293. ⟨10.1017/s1365100511000113⟩
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Journal Article: GROWTH AND IRREVERSIBLE POLLUTION: ARE EMISSION PERMITS A MEANS OF AVOIDING ENVIRONMENTAL AND POVERTY TRAPS? (2013) 
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-00862922
DOI: 10.1017/s1365100511000113
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