Speed and Quality of Collective Decision Making: Incentives for Information Provision

Hans Peter Grüner
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Hans Peter Grüner: University of Mannheim = Universität Mannheim

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Abstract: We study a one-shot information aggregation problem in which agents have to provide e®ort in order to understand the information they are supposed to process. Agents have a common interest in reaching a good decision but suffer from an individual cost of providing eff®ort. Showing that any problem which is incentive compatible for a single information processor is incentive compatible for a decentralized organization, but not vice versa, we derive a new rationale for decentralized information processing. For a class of problems, the fastest organization--the reduced tree proposed by Radner (1993) --yields also the best incentives for information processing.

Keywords: Information processing; hierarchies; incentives for information provision (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010-11-30
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-00911831v1
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Published in Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 2010, 76 (3), pp.734. ⟨10.1016/j.jebo.2010.08.013⟩

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-00911831

DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2010.08.013

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