The reinforcement axiom under sequential positional rules

Sébastien Courtin, Boniface Mbih, Issofa Moyouwou and Thomas Senné
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Issofa Moyouwou: MASS - UY1 - Université de Yaoundé I
Thomas Senné: CREM - Centre de recherche en économie et management - UNICAEN - Université de Caen Normandie - NU - Normandie Université - UR - Université de Rennes - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique

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Abstract: The reinforcement axiom roughly states that when an alternative is selected by two different constituencies, it must also be selected by their union. Hare and Coombs rules are special cases of sequential positional voting rules, which are known to violate this axiom. In this article, we first show that reinforcement can be violated by all such rules. We then evaluate, by the use of Monte Carlo simulations and the Fishburn-Gehrlein technique, the proportion of profiles at which this phenomenon occurs.

Keywords: reinforcement axiom; scoring voting rules (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-00914864
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

Published in Social Choice and Welfare, 2010, 35 (3), pp.473-500. ⟨10.1007/s00355-010-0449-6⟩

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Related works:
Journal Article: The reinforcement axiom under sequential positional rules (2010)
Working Paper: The reinforcement axiom under sequential positionnal rules (2010)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-00914864

DOI: 10.1007/s00355-010-0449-6

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