Are Condorcet procedures so bad according to the reinforcement axiom?

Sébastien Courtin, Boniface Mbih and Issofa Moyouwou
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Issofa Moyouwou: MASS - UY1 - Université de Yaoundé I

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Abstract: A Condorcet social choice procedure elects the candidate that beats every other candidate under simple majority when such a candidate exists. The reinforcement axiom roughly states that given two groups of individuals, if these two groups select the same alternative, then this alternative must also be selected by their union. Condorcet social choice procedures are known to violate this axiom. Our goal in this paper is to put this important voting theory result into perspective. We then proceed by evaluating how frequently this phenomenon is susceptible to occur.

Keywords: Condorcet-paradoxon; voting theory; paradox of voting (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014-04
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-00914870
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

Published in Social Choice and Welfare, 2014, 42 (4), pp.927-940. ⟨10.1007/s00355-013-0758-7⟩

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Related works:
Journal Article: Are Condorcet procedures so bad according to the reinforcement axiom? (2014)
Working Paper: Are Condorcet procedures so bad according to the reinforcement axiom? (2012)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-00914870

DOI: 10.1007/s00355-013-0758-7

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