Coalition configurations and share functions

Nicolas G. Andjiga and Sébastien Courtin ()
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Nicolas G. Andjiga: ENS YAOUNDé - ENS Yaoundé - UY1 - Université de Yaoundé I
Sébastien Courtin: THEMA - Théorie économique, modélisation et applications - UCP - Université de Cergy Pontoise - Université Paris-Seine - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique

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Abstract: Albizuri et al. (2006a, 2006b) defined values for games in which the players are organized into an a priori coalition configuration. In games with coalition configuration, we suppose that players organize themselves into coalitions that are not necessarily disjoint. A player can belong to more than one a priori coalition. In this paper we redefine coalition configuration values by using the concept of share function, as introduced by van der Laan and van den Brink (1998). A share function assigns to every player in a game its share in the worth to be distributed. We also define and characterize a general class of share function for games with coalition configuration which contains among other values those introduced by Albizuri et al. (2006a, 2006b).

Keywords: oalition configuration; Coalition structure; Share function; Shapley value; Banzhaf value. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-00914883v1
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

Published in Annals of Operations Research, 2015, 225 (1), pp.3 - 25. ⟨10.1007/s10479-014-1754-8⟩

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-00914883

DOI: 10.1007/s10479-014-1754-8

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