Positional rules and q-Condorcet consistency

Sébastien Courtin (), Mathieu Martin and Bertrand Tchantcho
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Sébastien Courtin: THEMA - Théorie économique, modélisation et applications - UCP - Université de Cergy Pontoise - Université Paris-Seine - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique
Mathieu Martin: THEMA - Théorie économique, modélisation et applications - UCP - Université de Cergy Pontoise - Université Paris-Seine - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique
Bertrand Tchantcho: École normale supérieure [ENS] - Yaoundé 1

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Abstract: A well-known result in Social Choice theory is the following: every scoring rule (positional rules) violates Condorcet consistency. A rule is Condorcet consistent when it selects the alternative that is preferred to every other alternative by a majority of individuals. In this paper, we investigate some limits of this negative result. We expose the relationship between a weaker version of the Condorcet consistency principle and the scoring rules. Our main objective is then to study the condition on the quota that ensure that positional rules (simple and sequential) satisfy this principle.

Keywords: Positional rules (simple and sequential); Condorcet consistency; q-Majority (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-00914900
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (9)

Published in Review of Economic Design, 2015, 19 (3), pp.229 - 245. ⟨10.1007/s10058-015-0173-x⟩

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-00914900

DOI: 10.1007/s10058-015-0173-x

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