Preference Intensity Representation: Strategic Overstating in Large Elections

Matias Nuñez and Jean-François Laslier

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Abstract: If voters vote strategically, is it useful to offer them the possibility of expressing nuanced opinions, or would they always overstate the intensity of their preferences? For additive voting rules, say that a ballot is extremal if it is neither abstention-like nor can be expressed as a mixture of the available ballots. We give a sufficient condition for strategic equivalence: if two rules share the same set of extremal ballots (up to an homothetic transformation), they are strategically equivalent in large elections. This condition is also necessary for the strategic equivalence of positional rules. These results do not hold for small electorates.

Keywords: Strategic; voting; Voting; equilibria (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013-02
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-00917099
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (10)

Published in Social Choice and Welfare, 2013, pp.0176-1714. ⟨10.1007/s00355-013-0728-0⟩

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Journal Article: Preference intensity representation: strategic overstating in large elections (2014)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-00917099

DOI: 10.1007/s00355-013-0728-0

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