The Respective Effects of Being Observed and Sanctioned in Modified Dictator and Ultimatum Games

Pierre Garrouste () and Agnès Festré
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Pierre Garrouste: GREDEG - Groupe de Recherche en Droit, Economie et Gestion - UNS - Université Nice Sophia Antipolis (1965 - 2019) - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - UniCA - Université Côte d'Azur

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Abstract: We experiment within a laboratory the respective effects of being observed and sanctioned in both a dictator and an ultimatum game. We obtain the classical results that individuals do not play the subgame perfect equilibria. We also show that being observed increases the offers made by the proposer in the dictator game but this effect is difficult to identify in the ultimatum game. We also find that in the dictator game, the more the individuals are sensitive to observation the less they are to sanction.

Keywords: sanction; observation; dictator and ultimatum games (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
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Published in ISRN Economics, 2013, 2013 (ID761482), 13 p. ⟨10.1155/2013/761482⟩

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-00923594

DOI: 10.1155/2013/761482

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