Envelopes and Geometrical Covers of Side-Payment Games and their Market Representations

Philippe Artzner, Claude d'Aspremont and Louis-André Gérard-Varet

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Abstract: This paper deals with issues concerning the core as a solution concept for games in coalitional form as well as the use of these games in representing economies of a certain formal type. Side-payment games are imbedded in the more general class of no-side-payment games. It is shown that to a given side-payment game having an empty core one may associate two different no-side payment games with the same (nonempty) core: the "envelope" and the "geometrical cover". The discrepancy is explained in terms of market games.

Date: 1986-02-01
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Published in Mathematics of Operations Research, 1986, 11 (1), pp.19-29. ⟨10.1287/moor.11.1.19⟩

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Working Paper: Envelopes and geometrical covers of side-payment games and their market representations (1986)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-00950764

DOI: 10.1287/moor.11.1.19

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