Responsabilité sociale d'une entreprise publique: une formalisation du jeu des acteurs

Myriam Donsimoni () and Daniel Labaronne
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Myriam Donsimoni: PACTE - Pacte, Laboratoire de sciences sociales - UPMF - Université Pierre Mendès France - Grenoble 2 - UJF - Université Joseph Fourier - Grenoble 1 - IEPG - Sciences Po Grenoble - Institut d'études politiques de Grenoble - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique
Daniel Labaronne: Larefi - Laboratoire d'analyse et de recherche en économie et finance internationales - UB - Université de Bordeaux

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Abstract: We study the behavior of managers of a public company, the Chérifien Phosphates Office, and local officials engaged in a relationship of CSR. What are the theoretical foundations of this relationship and the strategies of these actors? We formalize, from game theory, the influence of managers of the OCP on the action of elected officials. This influence is exercised either by cooperation or by the control. It can lead to information asymmetry generated by politicians. We examine the attitude of managers OCP facing this biased situation to draw managerial lessons.

Keywords: private and asymetric information (D82); game theory (C7); social responsibility (M14); firm behavior (D21); corporate governance (G34); gouvernance d'entreprise (G34); information privée et asymétrique (D 82); comportement des entreprises (D21); responsabilité sociale (M14); théorie des jeux (C7) (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
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Published in MIR: Management International Review, 2014, 18 (2), pp.22-38

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